Abstract. We present a probabilistic extension of the description logic ALC for reasoning about statistical knowledge. We consider conditional statements over proportions of the domain and are interested in the probabilistic-logical consequences of these proportions. After introducing some general reasoning problems and analyzing their properties, we present first algorithms and complexity results for reasoning in some fragments of Statistical ALC.
Introduction
Probabilistic logics enrich classical logics with probabilities in order to incorporate uncertainty. In [5] , probabilistic logics have been classified into three types that differ in the way how they handle probabilities. Type 1 logics enrich classical interpretations with probability distributions over the domain and are well suited for reasoning about statistical probabilities. This includes proportional statements like "2% of the population suffer from a particular disease." Type 2 logics consider probability distributions over possible worlds and are better suited for expressing subjective probabilities or degrees of belief. For instance, a medical doctor might say that she is 90% sure about her diagnosis. Type 3 logics combine type 1 and type 2 logics allow to reason about both kinds of uncertainty.
One basic desiderata of probabilistic logics is that they generalize a classical logic. That is, the probabilistic interpretation of formulas with probability 1 should agree with the classical interpretation. However, given that first-order logic is undecidable, a probabilistic first-order logic that satisfies our basic desiderata will necessarily be undecidable. In order to overcome the problem, we can, for instance, restrict to Herbrand interpretations over a fixed domain [2, 9, 13] or consider decidable fragments like description logics [3, 8, 10] .
Probabilistic type 2 extensions of description logics have been previously studied in [11] . In the unpublished appendix of this work, a type 1 extension of ALC is presented along with a proof sketch for EXPTIME-completeness of the corresponding satisfiability problem. This type 1 extension enriches classical interpretations with probability distributions over the domain as suggested in [5] . We consider a similar, but more restrictive setting here. We are interested in an ALC extension that allows statistical reasoning. However, we do not impose a probability distribution over the domain. Instead, we are only interested in reasoning about the proportions of a population satisfying some given properties. For instance, given statistical information about the relative frequency of certain symptoms, diseases and the relative frequency of symptoms given diseases, one can ask the relative frequency of a disease given a particular combination of symptoms. Therefore, we consider only classical ALC interpretations with finite domains and are interested in the relative proportions that are true in these interpretations.
Hence, interpretations in our framework can be regarded as a subset of the interpretations in [11] , namely those with finite domains and a uniform probability distribution over the domain. These interpretations are indeed sufficient for our purpose. In particular, by considering strictly less interpretations, we may be able to derive tighter answer intervals for some queries. Our approach bears some resemblance to the random world approach from [4] . However, the authors in [4] consider possible worlds with a fixed domain size N and are interested in the limit of proportions as N goes to infinity. We are interested in all finite possible worlds that satisfy certain proportions and ask what statistical statements must be true in all these worlds.
We begin by introducing Statistical ALC in Section 2 together with three relevant reasoning problems. Namely, the Satisfiability Problem, the l-Entailment problem and the p-Entailment problem. In Section 3, we will then discuss some logical properties of Statistical ALC. In Section 4 and 5, we present first computational results for fragments of Statistical ALC.
Statistical ALC
We start by revisiting the classical description logic ALC. Given two disjoint sets N C of concept names and N R of role names, ALC concepts are built using the grammar rule C ::= ⊤ | A | ¬C | C ⊓ C | ∃r.C, where A ∈ N C and r ∈ N R . One can express disjunction, universal quantification and subsumption through the usual logical equivalences like C 1 ⊔ C 2 ≡ ¬(¬C 1 ⊓ ¬C 2 ). For the semantics, we focus on finite interpretations. An ALC interpretation I = (∆ I , · I ) consist of a non-empty, finite domain ∆ I and an interpretation function · I that maps concept names A ∈ N C to sets A I ⊆ ∆ I and roles names r ∈ N R to binary relations r
Here, we consider a probabilistic extension of ALC. Statistical ALC knowledge bases consist of probabilistic conditionals that are built up over ALC concepts.
Definition 1 (Conditionals, Statistical KB). A probabilistic ALC conditional is an expression of the form (C | D) [ℓ, u] , where C, D are ALC concepts and ℓ, u ∈ Q are rational numbers such that 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ u ≤ 1. A statistical ALC knowledge base (KB) is a set K of probabilistic ALC conditionals.
For brevity, we usually call probabilistic ALC conditionals simply conditionals. Intuitively, a conditional (C | D) [ℓ, u] expresses that the relative proportion of elements of D that also belong to C is between ℓ and u. In order to make this more precise, consider a finite ALC interpretation I, and an ALC concept X. We denote the cardinality of
I satisfies a statistical ALC knowledge base K iff it satisfies all conditionals in K. In this case, we call I a model of K and write I |= K. We denote the set of all models of K by Mod(K). As usual, K is consistent if Mod(K) = ∅ and inconsistent otherwise. We call two knowledge bases K 1 , K 2 equivalent and write
Example 3. Consider again the KB K flu from Example 2. Let I be an interpretation with 1000 individuals. 10 of these have the flu and 9 have both the flu and fever. Then I ∈ Mod(K flu ).
In classical ALC, knowledge bases are defined by a set of general concept inclu-
As shown next, GCIs can be seen as a special kind of conditionals, and hence statistical ALC KBs are a generalization of classical ALC KBs.
Otherwise,
[C⊓D]
Given a statistical ALC knowledge base K, the first problem that we are interested in is deciding consistency of K. We define the satisfiability problem for statistical ALC knowledge bases as usual.
Satisfiability Problem: Given a knowledge base K, decide whether Mod(K) = ∅. If K is consistent, we are interested in deriving (implicit) probabilistic conclusions. We can think of different reasoning problems in this context. First, we can define an entailment relation analogously to logical entailment. Then, the probabilistic conditional
In this case, we write K |= l (C | D) [ℓ, u] . In the context of type 2 probabilistic conditionals, this entailment relation has also been called just logical consequence [9] . l-Entailment Problem: Given a knowledge base K and a conditional
Example 6. Consider again the KB K flu from Example 2. As explained in Example 5, [∃has.fever] I ≥ 0.009 holds for all models I ∈ Mod(K). Therefore, it follows that K flu |= l (∃has.fever | ⊤)[0.009, 1]. That is, our statistical information suggests that at least 9 out of 1, 000 of our patients have fever.
Example 7. Consider a domain with birds (B), penguins (P) and flying animals (F). We let
That is, our statistical information suggests that at most 15 out of 100 birds in our population are penguins.
As usual, the satisfiability problem can be reduced to the l-entailment problem. ⊓ ⊔ Often, we do not want to check whether a specific conditional is entailed, but rather deduce tight probabilistic bounds for a statement. This problem is often referred to as the probabilistic entailment problem in other probabilistic logics, see [6, 9, 13] for instance. Consider a query of the form (C | D), where C, D are ALC concepts. We define the p-Entailment problem similar to the probabilistic entailment problem for type 2 probabilistic logics.
p-Entailment Problem: Given knowledge base K and a query (C | D), find minimal and maximal solutions of the optimization problems
Since the objective function
is bounded from below by 0 and from above by 1, the infimum m and the maximum M are well-defined whenever there is a model I ∈ Mod(K) such that [D] I > 0. In this case, we say that
In the context of type 2 probabilistic conditionals, this entailment relation has also been called tight logical consequence [9] . If [D] I = 0 for all I ∈ Mod(K), the p-Entailment problem is infeasible, that is, there exists no solution.
Example 9. In Example 7, we found that K birds |= l (P | B)[0, 0.15]. This bound is actually tight. Since 0 is always a lower bound and we showed that 0.15 is an upper bound, it suffices to give examples of interpretations that take these bounds. For the lower bound, let I 0 be an interpretation with 200 individuals. 100 of these individuals are birds and 85 are birds that can fly. There are no penguins. Then I 0 is a model of
. Construct I 1 from I 0 by letting the 15 non-flying birds be penguins. Then I 1 is another model of K birds and I 1 satisfies
, one might ask whether the values between m and M are actually taken by some model of K or whether there can be large gaps in between. For the probabilistic entailment problem for type 2 logics, we can show that the models of K do indeed yield a dense interval by noting that each convex combination of models is a model and applying the Intermediate Value Theorem from Real Analysis. However, in our framework, we do not consider probability distributions over possible worlds, but the worlds themselves, which are discrete in nature. We therefore cannot apply the same tools here. However, for each two models that yield different probabilities for a query, we can find another model that takes the probability in the middle of these probabilities.
Proof. Given an interpretation I and n ∈ N, we construct the interpretation I (n) as follows. We set ∆
that is, we make n different copies of the domain. For all A ∈ N C , we set A
and for all r ∈ N R , we set r
I1 that are non-zero, and
Assume w.l.o.g. that I 0 and I 1 have different domains (just rename the elements of one domain if necessary). For n, N ∈ N, let I n,N be the interpretation that is obtained from I by taking the union of the domains, concept and role interpretations. That is,
and r In,N = r
The last equality shows that
[Di] I 1 . Since, I 0 and I 1 satisfy the i-th conditional, I k ′ n,K ′ N satisfies the conditional as well. In case that both 
and the conditional is still satisfied. The case
Then we can show completely analogously that
We can now show that for each value between the lower and upper bound given by p-entailment, we can find a model that gives a probability arbitrarily close to this value.
Consider the following bisection algorithm: we let I 
I ⊤ i and we have
is a model of K that proves the claim.
⊓ ⊔
We now discuss some logical properties of Statistical ALC. We already noted that Statistical ALC generalizes classical ALC in Proposition 4. Furthermore, p-entailment yields a tight and dense (Proposition 11) answer interval for all queries whose condition can be satisfied by models of the knowledge base. Let us also note that statistical ALC is language invariant. That is, increasing the language by adding new concept or role names does not change the semantics of ALC. This can be seen immediately by observing that the interpretation of conditionals in (1) depends only on the concept and role names that appear in the conditional. Statistical ALC is also representation invariant in the sense that for all concepts
Hence, changing the syntactic representation of conditionals does not change their semantics. In particular, entailment results are independent of such changes.
Both l-and p-entailment satisfy the following independence property: whether or
depends only on the conditionals in K that are connected with the query. This may simplify answering the query by reducing the size of the KB. In order to make this more precise, we need some additional definitions. For an arbitrary ALC concept C, Sig(C) denotes the set of all concept and role names appearing in C. The conditionals
That is, two conditionals are directly connected iff they share concept or role names. Let ⇋ * denote the transitive closure of ⇋. We say that
Using an analogous definition for queries (qualitative conditionals) (C 1 | D 1 ) and (C 2 | D 2 ), we get the following result.
Proposition 12 (Independence). If K is consistent, we have
Proof. For both claims, it suffices to show that for each model
By consistency of K, there is a model I 0 of K. Let I 1 be the interpretation defined as the disjoint union of I 0 and I 2 . Since {κ ∈ K | κ ⇋ * (C | D)} and K \ {κ ∈ K | κ ⇋ * (C | D)} do not share any concept and role names by definition of connectedness, I 1 satisfies conditionals in
Another interesting property of probabilistic logics is continuity. Intuitively, continuity states that minor changes in the knowledge base do not yield major changes in the derived probabilities. However, as demonstrated by Courtney and Paris, this condition is too strong when reasoning with the maximum entropy model of the knowledge base [14, p. 90] . The same problem arises for the probabilistic entailment problem [16, Example 4] . While these logics considered subjective probabilities, the same problem occurs in our setting for statistical probabilities as we demonstrate now.
Example 13. Consider the knowledge base
The interpretation I = ({a, b}, · I ) with A I = {a, b}, B I = C I = {b} is a model of K, i.e., K is consistent. In particular, since A is interpreted by the whole domain of I we know that
for some m ∈ [0, 1]. As explained in Proposition 4, deterministic conditionals correspond to concept inclusions and so (B | C) [1, 1] and (C | B) [1, 1] imply that
the knowledge base that is obtained from K by decreasing the upper bound of the first conditional in K by an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0. That is,
Then the only way to satisfy the first two conditionals in K ′ is by interpreting A by the empty set. Indeed, the interpretation I ∅ that interprets all concept names by the empty set is a model of K ′ . So K ′ is consistent and
Hence, a minor change in the probabilities in the knowledge base can yield a severe change in the entailed probabilities. This means that the p-entailment relation that we consider here is not continuous in this way either.
As an alternative to this strong notion of continuity, Paris proposed to measure the difference between KBs by the Blaschke distance between their models. Blaschke continuity says that if KBs are close with respect to the Blaschke distance, the entailed probabilities are close. Blaschke continuity is satisfied by some probabilistic logics under maximum entropy and probabilistic entailment [14, 16] . In [14, 16] , probabilistic interpretations are probability distributions over a finite number of classical interpretations and the distance between two interpretations is the distance between the corresponding probability vectors. We cannot apply this definition here because we interpret conditionals by means of classical interpretations. It is not at all clear what a reasonable definition for the distance between two classical interpretations is. We leave the search for a reasonable topology on the space of classical interpretations for future work.
Proposition 4 and the fact that reasoning in ALC is EXPTIME-complete, show that our reasoning problems are EXPTIME-hard. However, we did not find any upper bounds on the complexity of reasoning in ALC so far. We will therefore focus on some fragments of ALC now.
To begin with, we will focus on the sublogic EL [1] of ALC that does not allow for negation and universal quantification. Formally, EL concepts are constructed by the grammar rule C ::= A | ⊤ | C⊓C | ∃r.C, where A ∈ N C and r ∈ N R . A statistical EL KB is a statistical ALC KB where conditionals are restricted to EL concepts. Notice that, due to the upper bounds in conditionals, statistical EL KBs are capable of expressing some weak variants of negations. For instance, a statement (C | ⊤)[ℓ, u] with u < 1 restricts every model I = (∆ I , · I ) to contain at least one element δ ∈ ∆ I \ C I . Thus, contrary to classical EL, statistical EL KBs may be inconsistent. Example 14. Consider the KB K 1 = (∅, C 1 ), where
which is clearly a contradiction. Thus, K 1 is inconsistent.
More interestingly, though, it is possible to simulate valuations over a finite set of propositional formulas wit the help of conditional statements. Thus, the satisfiability problem is at least NP-hard even for Statistical EL.
Theorem 15. The satisfiability problem for Statistical EL is NP-hard.
Proof. We provide a reduction from the well-known coNP-complete problem of deciding validity of a 3DNF formula. Let ϕ = n i=1 κ i be a 3DNF formula; that is, each
We construct a statistical EL KB as follows. Let V be the set of all variables appearing in ϕ. For every x ∈ V, we use two concept names A x and A ¬x . In addition, for every clause κ i we introduce a concept name B i , and create an additional concept name C.
Consider the KB K ϕ = (T ϕ , C ϕ ), where
Then it holds that ϕ is valid iff K ϕ is inconsistent.
On the other hand, consistency can be decided in non-deterministic exponential time, through a reduction to integer programming. Before describing the reduction in detail, we introduce a few simplifications.
Recall from Proposition 4 that a conditionals of the form (D | C) [1, 1] is equivalent to the classical GCI C ⊑ D. Thus, in the following we will often express statistical EL KBs as pairs K = (T , C), where T is a classical TBox (i.e., a finite set of GCIs), and C is a set of conditionals. A statistical EL KB K = (T , C) is said to be in normal form if all the GCIs in T are of the form
A ⊑ ∃r.B, ∃r.A ⊑ B and all its conditionals are of the form
where A, B ∈ N C ∪ {⊤}, and r ∈ N R . Informally, a KB is in normal form if at most one constructor is used in any GCI, and all conditionals are atomic (i.e., between concept names). Every KB can be transformed to an equivalent one (w.r.t. the original signature) in linear time using the normalization rules from [1] , and introducing new concept names for complex concepts appearing in conditionals. The main idea behind our consistency algorithm is to partition the finite domain of a model into the different types that they define, and use integer programming to verify that all the logical and conditional constraints are satisfied. Let N C (K) denote the set of all concept names appearing in the KB K. We call any subset θ ⊆ N C (K) a type for K. Intuitively, such a type θ represents all the elements of the domain that are interpreted to belong to all concept names A ∈ θ and no concept name A / ∈ θ. We denote as Θ(K) the set of all types of K. To simplify the presentation, in the following we treat ⊤ as a concept name that belongs to all types.
Given a statistical EL KB K = (T , C) in normal form, we consider an integer variable x θ for every type θ ∈ Θ(K). These variables will express the number of domain elements that belong to the corresponding type. In addition, x ⊤ will be used to represent the total size of the domain. We build a system of linear inequalities over these variables as follows. First, we require that all variables have a value at least 0, and that the sizes of all types add exactly the size of the domain.
Then, we ensure that all the conditional statements from the KB are satisfied by adding, for each statement
Finally, we must ensure that the types satisfy all the logical constraints introduced by the TBox. The GCI A 1 ⊓ A 2 ⊑ B states that every element that belongs to both A 1 and A 2 must also belong to B. This means that types containing A 1 , A 2 but excluding B should not be populated. We thus introduce the inequality
Dealing with existential restrictions requires checking different alternatives, which we solve by creating different linear programs. The GCI A ⊑ ∃r.B implies that, whenever there exists an element in A, there must also exist at least one element in B. Thus, to satisfy this axiom, either A should be empty (i.e., A∈θ x θ = 0), or B∈θ x θ ≥ 1. Hence, for every existential restriction of the form A ⊑ ∃r.B, we define the set
To deal with GCIs of the form ∃r.A ⊑ B, we follow a similar approach, together with the ideas of the completion algorithm for classical EL. For every pair of existential restrictions A ⊑ ∃r.B, ∃r.C ⊑ D, we define the set
Intuitively, A∈θ,D / ∈θ x θ ≥ 1 whenever there exists an element that belongs to A but not to D. If this is the case, and the GCIs A ⊑ ∃r.B, ∃r.C ⊑ D belong to the TBox T , then there must exist some element that belongs to B but not to C.
We call the hitting sets of Lemma 16. K is consistent iff there exists a program for K that is satisfiable.
Proof. The "only if" direction is straight-forward since the inequalities are sound w.r.t. the semantics of statistical KBs. We focus on the "if" direction only. Given a solution of the integer program, we construct an interpretation I = (∆, · I ) as follows. We create a domain ∆ with x ⊤ elements, and partition it such that for every type θ ∈ Θ(K), there is a class [[θ]] containing exactly x θ elements. For every nonempty class, select a representative element
The interpretation function · I maps every concept name A to the set
Given a non-empty class [[θ] ] such that A ∈ θ and A ⊑ ∃r.B ∈ T , let τ be a type such that B ∈ τ , x τ > 0, and for every ∃r.C ⊑ D ∈ T , if D / ∈ θ, then C / ∈ τ . Notice that such a τ must exist because the solution must satisfy at least one restriction in each F A,B,C,D . We define r 
For a GCI A 1 ⊓ A 2 ⊑ B ∈ T , by the inequality (5) it follows that for every type θ containing both
For every A ⊑ ∃r.B ∈ T , and every γ ∈ ∆, if γ ∈ A I then by construction there is an element
, then by construction there exists a type θ and an axiom A ⊑ ∃r.B ∈ T such that γ ∈ [[θ]] and γ ′ = δ τ . Then, for every GCI ∃r.C ⊑ D ∈ T , γ ′ ∈ C I implies C ∈ τ and hence D ∈ θ which means that γ ∈ D I .
Notice that the construction produces exponentially many integer programs, each of which uses exponentially many variables, measured on the size of the KB. Since satisfiability of integer linear programs is decidable in non-deterministic polynomial time on the size of the program, we obtain a non-deterministic exponential time upper bound for deciding consistency of statistical EL KBs.
Theorem 17. Consistency of statistical EL KBs is in NEXPTIME.
Reasoning with Open Minded KBs
In order to regain tractability, we now further restrict statistical EL KBs by disallowing upper bounds in the conditional statements. We call such knowledge bases open minded. Recall that, intuitively, conditionals specify that a proportion of the population satisfies some given properties. One interesting special case of p-entailment is the question how likely it is to observe an individual that belongs to a given concept. Table 1 . Rules for deciding m-necessity
Definition 18 (Open Minded KBs
Definition 20. Let K be an open minded KB, C a concept, and m
. The problem of m-necessity consists in deciding whether C is m-necessary in K.
We show that this problem can be solved in polynomial time. As in the previous section, we assume that the KB is in normal The algorithm initializes the structures S and L as
These structures are then updated using the rules from Table 1 . In each case, a rule is only applied if its execution extends the available knowledge; that is, if either S is extended to include one more tuple, or a lower bound in L is increased. In the latter case, only the larger value is kept through the function L.
The first three rules in Table 1 are the standard completion rules for classical EL. The remaining rules update the lower bounds for the likelihood of all relevant concept names, taking into account their logical relationship, as explained next.
Rule L 1 applies the obvious inference associated to conditional statements: from all the individuals that belong to B, (A | B) [ℓ, 1] states that at least 100ℓ% belong also to A. Thus, assuming that L(B) is the lowest proportion of elements in B possible, the proportion of elements in A must be at least ℓ ·L(B). L 3 expresses that if every element of B must also belong to A, then there must be at least as many elements in A as there are in B. Finally, L 2 deals with the fact that two concepts that are proportionally large must necessarily overlap. For example, if 60% of all individuals belong to A and 50% belong to B, then at least 10% must belong to both A and B; otherwise, together they would cover more than the whole domain.
The algorithm executes all the rules until saturation; that is, until no rule is applicable. Once it is saturated, we can decide m-necessity from the function L as follows: A is m-necessary iff m ≤ L(A). Before showing the correctness of this algorithm, we show an important property.
Notice that the likelihood information from L is never transferred through roles. The reason for this is that an existential restriction ∃r.B only guarantee the existence of one element belonging to the concept B. Proportionally, the number of elements that belong to B tends to 0.
Example 21. Consider the KB ({⊤ ⊑ ∃r.A}, ∅). For any n ∈ N, construct the interpretation I n := ({0, . . . , n}, · In ), where A In = {0} and r
It is easy to see that I n is a model of the KB and [A] In
/[⊤]
In < 1 /n. Thus, the best lower bound for m-necessity of A is 0, as correctly given by the algorithm. It is easy to see that this interpretation satisfies all conditional statements and the GCIs A 1 ⊓ A 2 ⊑ B ∈ T . For every concept name A, create a new domain element δ A and extend the interpretation I such that δ A ∈ B iff (A, B) ∈ S. Given a role name r, we define r I := {(γ, δ B ) | A ⊑ ∃r.B, γ ∈ A I }. Then, this interpretation satisfies the KB K, and
Thus, the algorithm can correctly decide m-necessity of a given concept name. It remains only to be shown that the process terminates after polynomially many rule applications. To guarantee this, we impose an ordering in the rule applications. First, we apply all the classical rules C 1 -C 3 , and only when no such rules are applicable, we update the function L through the rules L 1 -L 3 . In this case, the rule that will update to the largest possible value is applied first. It is known that only polynomially many classical rules (on the size of T ) can be applied [1] . Deciding which bound rule to apply next requires polynomial time on the number of concept names in K. Moreover, since the largest update is applied first, the value of L(A) is changed at most once for every concept name A. Hence, only linearly many rules are applied. Overall, this means that the algorithm terminates after polynomially many rule applications, which yields the following result.
Theorem 23. Deciding m-necessity is in P.
Over the years, various probabilistic extensions of description logics have been investigated, see, for instance, [3, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, 17] . The one that is closest to our approach is the type 1 extension of ALC proposed in the appendix of [11] . Briefly, [11] , respectively. Conversely, each conditional can be rewritten as such a probabilistic constraint. However, there is a subtle but fundamental difference in the semantics. While the definition in [11] allows for probability distributions over arbitrary domains, we do not consider uncertainty over the domain. This comes down to allowing only finite domains and only the uniform distribution over this domain; that is, our approach further restricts the class of models of a KB. One fundamental difference between the two approaches is that Proposition 4 does not hold in [11] : the reason is that the conditional (C | D) [1, 1] can be satisfied by an interpretation I that contains an element x ∈ (C ⊓ ¬D) I , where x has probability 0. This difference is the main reason why the EXPTIME algorithm proposed by Lutz and Schröder cannot be transferred to our setting. It does not suffice to consider the satisfiable types independently, but other implicit subsumption relations may depend on the conditionals only. From C it follows that every element of A must also belong to B, and hence every domain element must be an element of C. However, ¬C defines a satisfiable type (w.r.t. T ) which will be interpreted as non-empty in the model generated by the approach in [11] .
Conclusions
We have introduced Statistical ALC, a new probabilistic extension of the description logic ALC for statistical reasoning. We analyzed the basic properties of this logic and introduced some reasoning problems that we are interested in. As a first step towards effective reasoning in Statistical ALC, we focused on EL, a well-known sublogic of ALC that, in its classical form, allows for polynomial-time reasoning. We showed that upper bounds in conditional constraints make the satisfiability problem in statistical EL NP-hard and gave an NEXPTIME algorithm to decide satisfiability. We showed that tractability can be regained by disallowing strict upper bounds in the conditional statements.
We are going to provide more algorithms and a more complete picture of the complexity of reasoning for Statistical ALC and its fragments in future work. A combination of integer programming and the inclusion-exclusion principle may be fruitful to design first algorithms for reasoning in full Statistical ALC.
